A Solidarity Levy on Premium Class Air Travel

An Impact Analysis on Tourism in Selected SIDS and LDC Economies

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Table of Contents

1.	Executive Summary	3
2.	Introduction	5
3.	Methods and Materials	6
4.	Findings	9
5.	Policy Insights and Recommendations	22
6.	References	24

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study assesses the potential of revenue generation from small to medium-level solidarity levies on premium class air travel, as an equitable and predictable source of adaptation finance for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The analysis covers ten climate-vulnerable countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Colombia, Fiji, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Zambia, representing diverse geographic and economic contexts. These countries already experience substantial losses due to climate change; in Fiji, for example, the equivalent of 5.8% of GDP (SLYCAN Trust, 2025). The tourism sector is particularly climate vulnerable in these countries.

Building on the principles of "polluter pays" and "ability to pay," the levy targets first- and business-class passengers, representing high-emission, high-income travel segments, to generate dedicated revenues without significantly affecting demand.

The analysis models a flat solidarity levy of USD 60 per premium ticket on short-haul flights (under 1,500 km) and USD 90 on long-haul flights (1,500 km or more), applied to first- and business-class passengers arriving in each country. Economy and premium-economy passengers are not levied. Premium passenger numbers are assumed to grow by 3 per cent a year from the 2023 base. Revenue is reported for 2024 and 2025, and demand effects are projected to 2035.

The results demonstrate that the solidarity levy can generate stable and significant revenue for supporting adaptation in particular in an equitable manner, without significant market distortion (see Table 1). The potential revenue is substantial. After allowing for the fall in premium-class demand, estimated revenue in 2024 ranges from USD 1.4 million in Sierra Leone to USD 84.2 million in Kenya, and totals about USD 199 million across the ten countries. These are direct resources, particularly valuable for heavily indebted countries.

Solidarity levies can therefore raise meaningful volumes of finance compared with existing international climate finance flows and could make a significant contribution to bridging the widening financing gap. For instance, across the ten countries, levy revenue would equal about 81 per cent of the average annual financing they have received from the Green Climate Fund (GCF). At country level, this ranges from about 10 per cent in Sierra Leone to 225 per cent in Mauritius, reflecting differences in GCF financing, passenger volumes and market structure.

This study also looks at potential impacts. In 2024, the levy would reduce premium-class arrivals by 2.2–7.5 per cent across the ten countries (about 81,000 passengers in total, around two-thirds of them in Colombia); economy-class travel is unaffected. Because a flat levy is a larger share of cheaper short-haul fares, the demand response is concentrated on short-haul routes: in 2024, premium-class demand falls by 2.8–8.8 per cent on short-haul routes and by 0.9–4.0 per cent on long-haul routes, with the largest effects in Colombia, Antigua and Barbuda and Kenya. These effects decline over time as fares rise while the levy stays fixed.

Table 1: Summary of results

Country	**Est. annual revenue 2024, demand-adjusted (USD mn)**	**Average annual GCF financing (USD mn/yr)**	**Demand-adjusted revenue as % of GCF average**	**Decrease in premium-class demand, 2024**	**Decrease in premium-class arrivals, 2024**
Antigua and Barbuda	6.41	7.70	83.2%	4.81%	840
Barbados	9.72	35.00	27.8%	2.68%	1,860
Colombia	49.62	45.50	109.1%	7.46%	53,330
Fiji	4.38	7.30	60.0%	3.01%	1,130
Kenya	84.21	49.30	170.8%	4.88%	15,090
Mauritius	22.04	9.78	225.4%	2.45%	3,080
Mozambique	9.49	18.50	51.3%	4.13%	1,330
Senegal	5.93	30.70	19.3%	2.18%	1,810
Sierra Leone	1.41	14.44	9.7%	2.20%	270
Zambia	5.70	26.29	21.7%	3.17%	1,840

Source: Authors' calculations. Levy rate: USD 60 short haul / USD 90 long-haul, assuming 3% passenger growth per year. GCF average: cumulative approvals divided by years from first approval to 2024. Arrivals rounded to the nearest 10.

2. INTRODUCTION

Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are at the forefront of climate crisis and have significant climate finance needs for addressing mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage (L&D). The UNEP's Adaptation Gap Report 2024 estimates that developing countries collectively require about USD 359 billion per year to implement adaptation strategies (UNEP, 2024). UNEP estimates adaptation finance flows to developing countries at USD 26 billion in 2023 (a decline from USD 28 billion in 2022), which is just one tenth of what is needed (UNEP, 2025). This gap is particularly acute in SIDS and LDCs. Given slow disbursement cycles and declining donor commitments to traditional mechanisms for adaptation finance, solidarity levies provide an actionable and complementary tool to close the widening adaptation finance gap faced by these countries.

The Global Solidarity Levies Task Force (GSLTF), co-chaired by the Governments of Barbados, France, and Kenya, is leading efforts to design such instruments to promote climate justice and ensure sustainable financing. A modelling study by CE Delft (2025) indicates that coordinated global aviation levies could generate €62–84 billion a year and emission cuts by 4-10 per cent below baseline level. This has a history of support. In 2008, the LDC Group submitted to the UNFCCC a proposal called the International Air Passenger Adaptation Levy (IAPAL) (Maldives, 2008). The idea was articulated and discussed further by Benito Muller (Muller, Huq & Filipp, 2023).

Following this, Khan, Noor, Haque and Zaman (2025) argued that during the last 15 years, income of citizens across the globe as well as awareness and solidarity to support adaptation have significantly increased, together with rebounding of air travel after the COVID-19 pandemic. This review showed that demand reduction from modest levies is almost insignificant, underscoring the viability of such a levy. This report explores a business/first-class solidarity levy on passengers travelling to and from ten selected countries — Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Colombia, Fiji, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zambia — representing SIDS and LDCs. The sample includes two full members of the Premium Flyers Solidarity Coalition (Kenya and Sierra Leone) and two observers (Antigua and Barbuda and Fiji). Building on the principles of "polluter pays" and "ability to pay," the proposed levy targets first-and-business-class passengers, representing high-emission, high-income travel segments, to generate dedicated adaptation revenues without significantly affecting demand. Such levies can contribute as 'auto-generation mechanisms' without depending on the political expediencies of rich country support.

The study models a flat solidarity levy on first- and business-class tickets of USD 60 for short-haul flights (under 1,500 km) and USD 90 for long-haul flights (1,500 km or more). It estimates the revenue such a levy would raise in each country, compares it with historical Green Climate Fund (GCF) financing, and assesses the resulting change in premium-class demand and its implications for tourism. The aim is to examine the role of premium-class levies as a revenue-mobilisation mechanism for climate-vulnerable countries and to contribute evidence to the work of the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force (GSLTF) and future climate-finance negotiations.

3. METHODS AND MATERIALS

We have used two datasets in this study to calculate passenger volumes and ticket prices: *First*, 2023 annual passenger volume for flights departing from the ten countries and those arriving in these countries. This data was provided by International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT). *Second*, average economy-class fares for 2019 at the country–haul level (short-haul <1,500 km; long-haul ≥1,500 km) for passengers arriving in each country. The fares are in nominal US dollars and refer to economy class. They were purchased by the ICCT from RDC Aviation, a commercial fare database, aggregated to country and haul level, and shared with the authors. Fares were available for 2019 only; later years are projected as described below.

Fares for the other cabins are derived by applying the cabin-class weighting factors of IATA Recommended Practice 1726 directly to the economy fare: premium economy 1.5×, business 4× and first 5× the economy fare. We use these factors as a proxy for relative fare levels. These factors were designed to allocate aircraft CO_2 emissions between cabins in proportion to floor space, not to estimate fares, and we are not aware of their prior use for that purpose. Two considerations support the choice. First, the implied business-to-economy ratio of 4 lies within the range reported by IATA, whose data show premium passengers paying on average three to six times the economy fare (IATA, 2017). Second, the factors are published, transparent and can be applied uniformly across countries where route-level fares by cabin are unavailable. The multipliers affect only the demand estimates, through the pre-levy fare in $\%\Delta P = L/P$; gross levy revenue does not depend on them. IATA data indicate that premium passengers accounted for 5.2 per cent of international passengers but 25.5 per cent of airline revenue in 2017, implying an average fare ratio nearer six. If actual ratios are higher than assumed, premium fares are underestimated and the estimated demand reductions are overstated, consistent with their interpretation as upper bounds.

This preserves a fixed relationship among cabin classes, anchored to the observed 2019 economy fare. Prices are then advanced through time using inflation only, so the projection remains auditable. For 2020 to 2024, fares compound by the observed year-on-year Consumer Price Index (CPI) ratios in sequence (2020/2019 through 2024/2023). If 2025 CPI is available, it is applied to set the 2025 level. From 2026 to 2035, fares grow at the average inflation rate_calculated over 2022–2025, providing a simple, stable path without adding speculative drivers such as fuel surcharges or exchange-rate dynamics.

Passenger volumes are projected from the 2023 base at 3 per cent a year. This rate is close to the global long-term growth rates in the International Civil Aviation Organization's traffic forecasts (about 3.1 per cent a year in the central scenario and 2.9 per cent in the low-growth scenario) and below regional forecasts for several sample economies (for example, 4–5 per cent or more for Sub-Saharan Africa in IATA projections). A single rate is applied to all countries for simplicity, given the uncertainty involved in applying global aviation trends to small, tourism-dependent economies. In each year, passengers are allocated to economy, premium economy, business and first class using their observed shares of total arrivals, and to short- and long-haul routes using the baseline distribution.

Levy revenue is estimated in two steps. Gross revenue is the number of premium-class passengers in each year, cabin class and haul type multiplied by the corresponding levy rate, summed across classes and hauls. It assumes that passenger numbers do not respond to the levy and is therefore an upper bound. Demand-adjusted revenue first applies the levy-induced fall in premium-class demand (estimated below) to each class and haul and then applies the levy rate. Because the elasticities used are likely to overstate the response of premium travellers, demand-adjusted revenue is a conservative estimate; the two figures together bracket the likely proceeds. Demand-adjusted revenue is used for all headline results and for the comparison with GCF financing.

Across all steps, inputs (class shares, CPI series, levy rates, climate finance needs, and loss estimates) are documented alongside their sources. The design intentionally prioritizes clarity and traceability: prices follow observed and averaged inflation, demand follows simple growth paths, and revenues are a transparent product of passengers and rates, enabling easy auditing and scenario comparison.

The levy rates are set in line with the higher range of per-ticket premium-class levies discussed in Global Solidarity Levies Task Force proposals (GSLTF, 2025). They are illustrative rather than recommended rates, chosen to examine revenue and demand effects at a level relevant to current policy discussions. Table 2 sets out the levy applied to each passenger group.

Table 2: Levy rates applied in the analysis (USD per one-way ticket)

Passenger group	Short-haul (under 1,500 km)	Long-haul (1,500 km or more)
First class	60	90
Business class	60	90
Premium economy	Not levied	Not levied
Economy	Not levied	Not levied

Note: Applied to passengers arriving in each country. Passenger growth: 3% a year from the 2023 base. Revenue reported for 2024 and 2025; demand effects for 2024–2035.

To indicate the scale of potential levy revenue, it is compared with each country's historical Green Climate Fund (GCF) financing. Cumulative GCF funding approved for each country is divided by the number of years from its first approval to 2024, giving an average annual amount. This 2024-based average is used as the benchmark for both 2024 and 2025, so that differences between the two years reflect changes in levy revenue only. The benchmark measures finance received, not finance needed, and is used only to indicate relative scale.

Projection of air ticket prices from the 2019 baseline to the 2024–2035 period is conducted using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), a methodologically robust and widely recognized approach in applied economic analysis. The use of CPI anchors projections to a stable pre-pandemic reference year (2019), avoiding distortions caused by COVID-19 disruptions. Moreover, CPI-based projections integrate major cost drivers affecting ticket prices – such as fuel, labour, and operational expenses – providing a comprehensive reflection of pricing dynamics. This approach ensures cross-country consistency and

comparability, which is particularly important for elasticity studies aimed at assessing relative responsiveness to price changes rather than predicting absolute price levels.

The demand analysis estimates how first- and business-class demand responds to the levy itself. For each country, year, cabin class and haul type, the levy-induced price change is the levy divided by the pre-levy fare ($\%\Delta P = L / P$). The change in premium-class demand is then obtained by applying the price elasticity of demand (ε), following the standard relationship $\%\Delta Q = \varepsilon \times \%\Delta P$. Elasticities are taken from IATA (2007) and differ by region and haul: −0.88 (short-haul) and −0.80 (long-haul) for Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados; −1.10 and −1.00 for Colombia; and −0.53 and −0.48 for the remaining seven countries. These are estimates for all passengers rather than for premium travellers specifically. Because premium passengers are generally less price-sensitive, demand reductions based on these elasticities are treated as the upper bound.

No widely recognised premium-cabin elasticities exist in the literature. As a lower-bound sensitivity case, we therefore follow CE Delft (2019), which derived first- and business-class elasticities from the InterVISTAS economy-class estimates (the study underlying the IATA (2007) values used here) by applying the business-class coefficient in Brons et al. (2002). The resulting premium elasticities are about half the economy value for short- and medium-haul international travel (−0.57 against −1.12, a ratio of 0.51) and about a third for intercontinental travel (−0.25 against −0.80, a ratio of 0.31). We apply these ratios to our short-haul and long-haul elasticities respectively. Ratios are used rather than CE Delft's absolute adjustment, which would turn some of the low elasticities in our sample positive. The all-passenger elasticities therefore give the upper bound of the demand response, and the premium-adjusted elasticities the lower bound.

The CPI-based fare path described above is used only to set the pre-levy fare in each year; inflation itself does not enter the demand calculation. Because the levy is fixed in nominal US dollars while fares rise with inflation, the levy becomes a smaller share of the ticket price over time, and the estimated demand effect declines accordingly. Each annual figure is a level effect relative to a no-levy baseline in the same year; effects are not cumulative across years. Results are reported for the high-levy scenario (USD 60 short-haul and USD 90 long-haul, applied to both first and business class). Premium-class results are the simple average of first- and business-class responses, as the passenger data do not separate the two cabins, and short- and long-haul results are combined using each country's share of premium arrivals by haul. The linear (point-elasticity) form slightly overstates the response compared with a constant-elasticity specification (by up to about one-tenth of the estimated effect), which reinforces the upper-bound interpretation.

Economic exposure is estimated bottom-up as the loss of international visitor spending associated with the levy-induced fall in premium-class arrivals. For each country, the fall in premium arrivals in 2024 (Table 1) is multiplied by average spending per international overnight visitor and by a premium-spending factor. Average spending per visitor is international tourism receipts divided by international overnight arrivals in 2019, the last pre-pandemic year with complete data for most countries (2017 for Senegal), from UN Tourism, expressed in 2024 US dollars using the US consumer price index. Premium travellers are assumed to spend twice as much as the average visitor; because no cross-country estimates of this ratio are available, the factor is an assumption, and the results scale proportionally with it.

A premium traveller deterred by the levy may either cancel the trip or downgrade to economy and still travel; only cancellation reduces spending in the destination. We therefore report a range. The upper end assumes that every deterred traveller cancels; at the lower end all downgrade, so destination spending is unaffected. The central estimate assumes that half do each, and a further case combines the central assumption with the premium-adjusted elasticities described above. Losses are expressed as a share of GDP (WTTC, 2025) to indicate scale only: lost spending exceeds the value added it would have generated, and the estimates exclude substitution by other visitors and multiplier effects. An alternative approach would relate the levy to the total cost of the trip rather than to the airfare alone; USD 60 is about 10 per cent of a short-haul premium fare to Antigua and Barbuda but about 1.4 per cent of a trip costing roughly USD 4,270. Applying a tourism-demand elasticity to this smaller price change would likely give smaller effects, and is left for future work.

4. FINDINGS

Potential revenue generation

Potential air-levy revenue is unevenly distributed across countries. After allowing for the fall in premium-class demand, the ten countries could collectively generate about USD 198.9 million in 2024 and USD 209.6 million in 2025 (USD 210.1 million and USD 220.9 million before that adjustment). Kenya has by far the greatest revenue potential, at USD 84.2 million in 2024 and USD 90.4 million in 2025. It is followed by Colombia (USD 49.6 million and USD 51.8 million) and Mauritius (USD 22.0 million and USD 22.8 million). These three countries account for about 78 per cent of combined levy revenue. At the other end of the distribution, Sierra Leone could generate only USD 1.4 million in 2024 and USD 1.5 million in 2025, and Fiji, Zambia and Senegal less than USD 6.2 million a year each. The demand response reduces revenue by 2–6 per cent. The largest reductions are in Colombia, Kenya and Antigua and Barbuda, where short-haul traffic or high elasticities make premium demand most responsive. Levy-generating capacity is therefore shaped principally by passenger volumes, international connectivity, tourism and the structure of national aviation markets.

Comparison to GCF financing

The comparison with historical GCF financing demonstrates the considerable domestic revenue potential of an air levy. In 2024, demand-adjusted levy revenue would equal about 81.4 per cent of the ten countries' combined average annual GCF financing (USD 244.5 million). At country level, it would exceed average GCF financing in Mauritius (225.4 per cent), Kenya (170.8 per cent) and Colombia (109.1 per cent). It would cover 83.2 per cent in Antigua and Barbuda, 60.0 per cent in Fiji, 51.3 per cent in Mozambique, 27.8 per cent in Barbados, 21.7 per cent in Zambia, 19.3 per cent in Senegal and only 9.7 per cent in Sierra Leone. Table 3 presents the summarized findings.


Table 3: Estimated annual revenue from a premium-class solidarity levy compared with average annual GCF financing, 2024–2025

Country	**Gross revenue 2024 (USD mn)**	**Demand-adjusted revenue 2024 (USD mn)**	**Demand-adjusted revenue 2025 (USD mn)**	**Average annual GCF financing (USD mn/yr)**	**Adjusted revenue as % of GCF, 2024**	**Adjusted revenue as % of GCF, 2025**	**Adjusted revenue as % of GCF, 2035**
Antigua and Barbuda	6.81	6.41	6.66	7.70	83.2%	86.5%	110.2%
Barbados	9.97	9.72	9.79	35.00	27.8%	28.0%	35.2%
Colombia	53.01	49.62	51.81	45.50	109.1%	113.9%	143.0%
Fiji	4.49	4.38	4.53	7.30	60.0%	62.1%	75.9%
Kenya	89.64	84.21	90.39	49.30	170.8%	183.3%	224.8%
Mauritius	22.83	22.04	22.76	9.78	225.4%	232.7%	289.9%
Mozambique	10.02	9.49	9.93	18.50	51.3%	53.7%	67.0%
Senegal	6.03	5.93	6.15	30.70	19.3%	20.0%	24.4%
Sierra Leone	1.43	1.41	1.54	14.44	9.7%	10.6%	12.2%
Zambia	5.85	5.70	6.05	26.29	21.7%	23.0%	27.6%

Source: Authors' calculations. Levy rate: USD 60 short-haul / USD 90 long-haul. Gross revenue assumes no change in passenger numbers (upper bound). The GCF average uses the same 2024-based benchmark for both years.

Against the same benchmark, coverage rises slightly in 2025, to 85.7 per cent for the ten countries combined, as passenger numbers grow and the demand effect eases. Mauritius (232.7 per cent), Kenya (183.3 per cent) and Colombia (113.9 per cent) remain above their historical average, and Antigua and Barbuda approaches it (86.5 per cent). Coverage would be 62.1 per cent in Fiji, 53.7 per cent in Mozambique, 28.0 per cent in Barbados, 23.0 per cent in Zambia, 20.0 per cent in Senegal and 10.6 per cent in Sierra Leone. Across the ten countries, cumulative GCF financing amounts to about USD 1.99 billion, but it is highly concentrated: Kenya, Colombia, Senegal, Barbados and Zambia together account for about 80 per cent. Annualised from each country's first approval year, the ten countries have received a combined average of USD 244.5 million a year up to 2024. This average is the benchmark used (see Annex 1).

Figure 1: Demand-adjusted levy revenue and revenue as a percentage of average annual GCF financing, 2024–2025



Revenue is shown for the two years for which passenger-based revenue was projected; the GCF benchmark is the same 2024-based average in both years. All figures in USD million.

Box 1: Air-levy revenue compared to public adaptation expenditure

Comparing potential air-levy revenue with public adaptation expenditure gives a clearer indication of its possible contribution to national adaptation financing.

Colombia provides the strongest contemporary comparison. In 2024, national-budget climate-investment expenditure amounted to about USD 305 million, of which about USD 131 million was classified specifically as adaptation (DNP, 2025). Demand-adjusted levy revenue of USD 49.6 million in 2024 would equal about 37.9 per cent of this adaptation expenditure, rising to 39.6 per cent on the 2025 estimate of USD 51.8 million.

In Kenya, actual public climate expenditure in FY2022/23 was about USD 653 million (UNICEF Kenya, 2026). Levy revenue of USD 84.2 million in 2024 and USD 90.4 million in 2025 would be equivalent to about 12.9 and 13.8 per cent respectively, a substantial addition.

For Fiji, the available evidence is broader: between 2016 and 2019, about USD 360 million a year was spent on public climate-related activities (Fijian Ministry of Economy, 2021). Relative to this amount, levy revenue would represent only around 1.2–1.3 per cent.

Comparable data were not readily and accurately available for the other countries.

Elasticity analysis and decrease in demand

This section estimates how first- and business-class demand responds to the levy (USD 60 short-haul; USD 90 long-haul). Table 4 reports the levy as a share of the 2024 premium fare, the resulting decrease in premium-class demand in 2024 and 2035, and the average over 2024–2035. The size of the price shock depends mainly on route length. Because short-haul premium fares are much lower than long-haul fares, a flat levy is a far larger proportional increase on short-haul tickets: it adds 5.3–13.6 per cent to a 2024 short-haul premium fare, compared with 1.9–4.0 per cent on long-haul routes. The largest short-haul shocks occur in Kenya (13.6 per cent), Fiji (13.2 per cent), Mauritius (12.5 per cent) and Mozambique (11.5 per cent), where short-haul premium fares are among the lowest in the sample (about USD 440–520). The smallest occur in Senegal (5.3 per cent) and Sierra Leone (5.6 per cent), where short-haul premium fares are the highest.

In 2024, short-haul premium demand falls by 2.8–8.8 per cent and long-haul premium demand by 0.9–4.0 per cent. Colombia shows the largest response on both route types (8.8 per cent short-haul; 4.0 per cent long-haul), reflecting the highest elasticities in the sample (−1.10 and −1.00) combined with a sizeable price shock. Antigua and Barbuda (7.6 per cent) and Kenya (7.2 per cent) follow on short-haul routes. Senegal (2.8 per cent short-haul) and Sierra Leone (0.9 per cent long-haul) show the smallest responses. When short- and long-haul routes are weighted by each country's premium traffic, the combined decrease in 2024 ranges from 2.2 per cent in Senegal and Sierra Leone to 7.5 per cent in Colombia. With premium-adjusted elasticities (lower bound), these decreases are roughly halved on short-haul routes and fall to about a third on long-haul routes; the combined 2024 decrease then ranges from about 1.0 per cent (Senegal, Mauritius and Barbados) to 3.6 per cent (Colombia). The demand effect declines over the projection period. Because the levy is fixed in nominal terms while fares rise

with inflation, the levy becomes a smaller share of the ticket price each year. By 2035, short-haul decreases range from 1.3 per cent (Zambia) to 6.2 per cent (Antigua and Barbuda), and long-haul decreases from 0.3 per cent (Zambia) to 2.4 per cent (Colombia). The decline is fastest where inflation is highest: in Zambia, where fares are projected to rise by 11.2 per cent a year from 2026, the short-haul effect falls from 4.2 per cent in 2024 to 1.3 per cent in 2035. In Antigua and Barbuda and Barbados, where projected fare growth is below 2 per cent a year, the effect is the most persistent.

Table 4: Levy-induced decrease in premium-class demand, 2024–2035

Country	**Levy as % of premium fare, SH 2024**	**Levy as % of premium fare, LH 2024**	**Elasticity SH / LH**	**SH demand decrease 2024 (%)**	**LH demand decrease 2024 (%)**	**SH demand decrease 2035 (%)**	**LH demand decrease 2035 (%)**	**Avg. SH decrease 2024–2035 (%)**	**Avg. LH decrease 2024–2035 (%)**
Antigua and Barbuda	8.6	3.2	−0.88 / −0.80	7.56	2.54	6.19	2.07	6.87	2.31
Barbados	6.5	2.7	−0.88 / −0.80	5.72	2.19	4.69	1.80	5.13	1.97
Colombia	8.0	4.0	−1.10 / −1.00	8.80	4.01	5.17	2.35	6.88	3.14
Fiji	13.2	4.0	−0.53 / −0.48	6.98	1.93	5.21	1.44	6.08	1.69
Kenya	13.6	3.2	−0.53 / −0.48	7.21	1.52	4.41	0.94	5.69	1.20
Mauritius	12.5	3.4	−0.53 / −0.48	6.63	1.63	4.26	1.05	5.46	1.34
Mozambique	11.5	3.2	−0.53 / −0.48	6.14	1.53	4.35	1.08	5.20	1.29
Senegal	5.3	3.2	−0.53 / −0.48	2.82	1.51	2.10	1.12	2.45	1.32
Sierra Leone	5.6	1.9	−0.53 / −0.48	3.00	0.92	1.71	0.52	2.21	0.68
Zambia	8.0	2.2	−0.53 / −0.48	4.24	1.03	1.34	0.32	2.57	0.62

Source: Authors' calculations. Demand decrease = elasticity × (levy ÷ pre-levy fare), averaged over first- and business-class fares; relative to a no-levy baseline in the same year. SH = short-haul; LH = long-haul.

Three implications follow. First, on long-haul routes, which carry most premium traffic to the island states (for example 86 per cent of premium arrivals in Barbados and 84 per cent in Mauritius), demand effects are modest, at about 1–4 per cent. Second, a flat per-ticket levy weighs most heavily on short-haul premium travel, which supports rates differentiated by distance, such as a lower short-haul rate or a rate set as a share of the fare, to protect regional connectivity. Third, if the levy is not indexed to inflation, both its demand effect and the real value of its revenue erode over time; indexation would preserve revenue but keep the demand effect at its initial level. These estimates apply only to first- and business-class passengers and do not imply an equivalent reduction in total passengers or flights.

Price Sensitivity to Economic Exposure

The elasticity analysis establishes the first link in the causal chain, and its findings vary considerably across the ten countries in ways that shape every downstream economic consequence. Price elasticity determines the magnitude of demand reduction that a levy-induced fare increase generates, but as the country-level results demonstrate, elasticity is neither uniform nor the sole determinant of economic exposure.

Economic exposure to the levy is small. Table 5 reports the loss of international visitor spending implied by the fall in premium-class arrivals as a range. A premium traveller deterred by the levy may cancel the trip or downgrade to economy and still travel; only cancellation reduces spending in the destination. If every deterred traveller cancels, the loss in 2024 totals about USD 232 million across the ten countries. In the central case, in which half cancel and half downgrade, it is about USD 116 million, and with premium-adjusted elasticities about USD 54 million. In the central case the loss is below 0.15 per cent of GDP in every country and below 0.05 per cent in eight. Antigua and Barbuda is the most exposed (0.14 per cent of GDP), followed by Barbados (0.08 per cent). Antigua and Barbuda's position reflects two factors: international visitors spend more there than anywhere else in the sample (about USD 3,700 per trip, more than three times the sample median), and its small economy depends heavily on tourism, which accounts for 81 per cent of GDP. Its demand response is also among the largest (4.8 per cent), owing to higher Caribbean elasticities and a large short-haul share of premium arrivals. In absolute terms, the largest loss is in Colombia (about USD 89 million in the central case), where high elasticities and a large volume of short-haul premium traffic produce the largest fall in premium arrivals (about 53,000).

Lost visitor spending and levy revenue are not directly comparable. Revenue is a fiscal transfer that remains in the country and is spent on adaptation, whereas the loss is gross spending before any substitution by other visitors or re-spending of levy proceeds. With that caveat, the central estimate is below levy revenue in nine of the ten countries, at 2–56 per cent of revenue. Colombia is the exception: its central loss is about 1.8 times its revenue, falling below it (about 83 per cent) with premium-adjusted elasticities. This reflects the highest elasticities in the sample combined with a predominantly short-haul premium market (72 per cent of premium arrivals). It points to a design response rather than a reason to forgo the levy: a lower short-haul rate, or a rate set as a share of the fare, would reduce the effect where premium traffic is mainly short-haul and price-sensitive.

Table 5: Loss of international visitor spending from the levy-induced fall in premium arrivals, 2024

Country	**Lost premium arrivals**	**Spend per visitor (2024 USD)**	**Loss if all cancel (USD mn)**	**Loss, central case (USD mn)**	**Central case, premium elasticities (USD mn)**	**Central case, % of GDP**
Antigua and Barbuda	840	3,685	6.2	3.1	1.4	0.14
Barbados	1,860	2,933	10.9	5.5	2.0	0.08
Colombia	53,330	1,672	178.3	89.2	42.8	0.02
Fiji	1,130	1,320	3.0	1.5	0.6	0.03
Kenya	15,090	603	18.2	9.1	4.4	0.01
Mauritius	3,080	1,578	9.7	4.9	1.9	0.03
Mozambique	1,330	153	0.4	0.2	0.1	<0.01
Senegal	1,810	394	1.4	0.7	0.3	<0.01
Sierra Leone	270	837	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.01
Zambia	1,840	794	2.9	1.5	0.7	0.01
Total	***80,580***		***231.5***	***115.7***	***54.4***	

Method: see Section 3. Lost arrivals are from Table 1 (all-passenger elasticities). Spending per visitor is UN Tourism international tourism receipts ÷ international overnight arrivals for 2019 (2017 for Senegal), in 2024 US dollars. Premium travellers are assumed to spend twice the average visitor. "All cancel" assumes every deterred premium traveller cancels the trip; the central case assumes half cancel and half downgrade to economy, which leaves destination spending unchanged; the premium-elasticity column combines the central case with the CE Delft (2019) premium adjustment. Lost spending exceeds lost value added; substitution by other visitors and multiplier effects are excluded.

Box 2: Existing passenger charges in the study countries

The proposed levy would not be introduced into an untaxed market. Most of the study countries already charge departing international passengers a flat fee, collected through the ticket price and applied equally to all cabins.

Several have raised these charges recently. Kenya increased its Air Passenger Service Charge for international passengers to USD 50 in October 2025. Fiji raised its departure tax to FJD 200 in August 2025. Antigua and Barbuda announced an increase from USD 40 to USD 50 in June 2026. Passenger charges are therefore an established and politically accepted source of revenue in these countries.

Two features of the existing charges matter for the design of a premium-class levy. First, they are flat across cabins, so an economy passenger pays the same as a first-class passenger; a premium-class levy would add a progressive element that current charges lack. Second, some countries already earmark passenger charges or use them for international solidarity. Kenya's amended charge now also funds the national meteorological service and the Tourism Fund, and Mauritius

applies the air-ticket solidarity levy that finances Unitaid. These arrangements provide existing collection channels and legal templates. For comparison, France's solidarity levy, revised in March 2025, charges premium-cabin passengers EUR 30, EUR 80 and EUR 120 depending on distance; the USD 60 and USD 90 rates modelled here fall within this range.

Country	***Existing charges on departing international passengers***	***Approx. USD***	***Levy as % of 2024 premium fare (SH / LH)***
Antigua and Barbuda	Passenger departure tax USD 40; increase to USD 50 announced June 2026 (CARICOM travel exempt)	40–50	10.3% / 3.8%
Barbados	Airline Travel and Tourism Development Fee USD 70 (international) / USD 35 (CARICOM), since October 2018	70	7.6% / 3.2%
Colombia	International airport fee USD 46 (Resolution 00395 of 2022); USD 1 departure tax for child-protection programmes (Law 679 of 2001; collection rules in Decree 0625 of 2026)	47	9.1% / 4.6%
Fiji	Airport departure tax FJD 200 from 1 August 2025 (FJD 170 from August 2024)	~88	15.1% / 4.6%
Kenya	Air Passenger Service Charge USD 50 (international), amended October 2025; proceeds also fund the meteorological service and the Tourism Fund	50	16.3% / 3.8%
Mauritius	Air-ticket solidarity levy financing Unitaid; total international departure taxes and fees USD 44.9 (AFRAA, 2020)	~45	15.6% / 4.3%
Mozambique	Total international departure taxes and fees USD 47.5 (AFRAA, 2020)	~48	14.0% / 3.9%
Senegal	Airport Infrastructure Development Charge (RDIA) FCFA 35,400 (≈EUR 54), since 2005; with passenger, security and civil-aviation charges, FCFA 77,400 in total	~60 (RDIA); ~130 (total)	6.5% / 3.9%
Sierra Leone	Total international departure taxes and fees USD 139 (AFRAA, 2022), including a USD 25 security fee suspended from 6 July 2026 pending review	~114–139	7.0% / 2.4%
Zambia	Infrastructure and development charge ZMW 52.80 (≈USD 10 at introduction, June 2013), in addition to departure and security charges; total international departure taxes and fees USD 51.9 (AFRAA, 2020)	~52	10.4% / 2.8%

Policy justification

The findings provide an indication of whether domestically generated levy revenue could supplement international climate finance at a meaningful scale and within a comparatively rapid timeframe. In countries such as Mauritius, Kenya and Colombia, the potential annual proceeds could exceed their historical average annual access to GCF financing. Even in countries with lower comparative shares, the levy could provide useful domestic co-financing, support project preparation, fund locally determined priorities and complement – rather than replace – international climate finance. An air-passenger levy could be collected more regularly through existing ticketing and taxation systems, providing governments with a predictable and nationally controlled source of revenue for immediate or recurring adaptation priorities. The findings are not intended as a threshold test or a one-dimensional assessment of whether adopting the levy is justified. The policy case also depends on equity, environmental effectiveness, administrative feasibility, behavioral incentives and consistency with broader climate-finance responsibilities.

Differences between countries are primarily shaped by the size and composition of their aviation markets. Countries with larger passenger volumes, stronger long-haul connectivity and greater premium-class travel can generate more revenue from the same levy structure. Countries with thinner aviation markets may generate smaller amounts even where their climate vulnerability and adaptation needs are severe. These differences do not imply that the policy is less justified in Senegal, Sierra Leone, Fiji or other lower-yield markets. Instead, they demonstrate that national revenue potential and climate-finance need do not necessarily coincide.

A pooled solidarity window: addressing equity

This mismatch creates an equity concern. If every country retained only the revenue generated within its own aviation market, higher-traffic countries would benefit most, while highly vulnerable countries with small markets could continue to face substantial financing gaps. A coordinated mechanism should therefore combine national revenue retention with a pooled solidarity window through which a proportion of proceeds from higher-yield markets supports lower-yield, climate-vulnerable countries. Allocation from this window could be guided by climate vulnerability, adaptation-finance needs, fiscal capacity and access to international finance.

Table 6 illustrates how a pooled window could work, using the simplest rule: each country places a fixed share of its own demand-adjusted revenue into a common pool, which is shared equally among the ten. With a 10 per cent pool, Sierra Leone's receipts would more than double, from USD 1.4 million to USD 3.3 million, while the three largest contributors (Kenya, Colombia and Mauritius) would see their own receipts fall by 1–8 per cent. With a 25 per cent pool, Sierra Leone would receive USD 6.0 million, more than four times its own revenue. Fiji and Antigua and Barbuda would then exceed their historical average annual GCF financing (113 and 127 per cent), Kenya and Mauritius would remain well above theirs, and Colombia would fall just below (93 per cent). An allocation based on vulnerability, adaptation need or fiscal capacity, as proposed above, would change these country results but not the total.

Table 6: Illustrative pooled solidarity window

Country	**Own revenue**	**Net revenue, 10% pooled**	**Change**	**Net revenue, 25% pooled**	**Change**	**Net revenue as % of GCF average (25%)**
Antigua and Barbuda	6.41	7.75	+21%	9.78	+53%	127%
Barbados	9.72	10.74	+10%	12.26	+26%	35%
Colombia	49.62	46.65	−6%	42.19	−15%	93%
Fiji	4.38	5.93	+35%	8.26	+89%	113%
Kenya	84.21	77.78	−8%	68.13	−19%	138%
Mauritius	22.04	21.83	−1%	21.51	−2%	220%
Mozambique	9.49	10.53	+11%	12.09	+27%	65%
Senegal	5.93	7.33	+24%	9.42	+59%	31%
Sierra Leone	1.41	3.26	+131%	6.03	+328%	42%
Zambia	5.70	7.12	+25%	9.25	+62%	35%
Total	***198.91***	***198.91***		***198.91***		

Source: Authors' calculations. Each country contributes the stated share of its own revenue; the pool is divided equally among the ten countries. Illustrative only. All figures in USD million, demand-adjusted and for 2024.

Policy design can further improve both revenue generation and fairness through class- and distance-based tiering, higher charges on premium and frequent travel, narrowly defined protections for essential travel, and application to both arrivals and departures where legally and administratively feasible. Revenues should be transparently reported and legally earmarked for adaptation or other clearly specified climate purposes. They should also remain additional to existing domestic expenditure, GCF resources and developed-country climate-finance obligations.

In several countries, an air levy could provide resources through a more continuous domestic collection mechanism. In lower-yield countries, it could still make a useful contribution when combined with international matching finance and pooled redistribution. The principal policy question is therefore not whether a country crosses a predetermined revenue threshold, but how the levy can be designed and coordinated to provide timely, additional and equitable adaptation finance across countries with very different aviation markets and climate vulnerabilities.

5. POLICY INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy Insights

The findings demonstrate that air levy could become a significant, predictable and nationally controlled source of climate finance. Unlike GCF financing, which depends on project preparation, accreditation, approval and implementation cycles, levy revenue could be collected continuously through existing ticketing and taxation systems. It could therefore provide governments with more regular resources for locally determined adaptation priorities, including early-warning systems, resilient infrastructure, coastal protection, heat-risk management and locally led adaptation. It is important to emphasize, however, that such levies would not and should not serve as a substitute for international financing, but should instead be viewed as an important complementary tool. The existing Unitaid airline ticket levy demonstrates that such levies are operationally feasible and can provide long-term international financing. The OECD notes that this mechanism, established in 2006, has subsequently been implemented by ten countries (OECD, 2025).

The potential becomes substantially greater when such instruments are coordinated internationally. The Global Solidarity Levies Task Force estimates that a global levy on aviation kerosene could generate approximately USD 19 billion annually, while a progressive frequent-flyer levy could raise around USD 121 billion per year (Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, 2024). The IMF estimates that carbon pricing covering international aviation and shipping could mobilize as much as USD 200 billion annually by 2035, while simultaneously encouraging efficiency and technological change (IMF, 2024).

These amounts would be significant in relation to the global adaptation-finance gap. UNEP estimates that developing countries will require USD 310–365 billion annually for adaptation by 2035, compared with international public adaptation-finance flows of only USD 26 billion in 2023. It implies a shortfall of approximately USD 284–339 billion (UNEP, 2025). If entirely directed towards adaptation, the estimated USD 121 billion from a global frequent-flyer levy could theoretically cover approximately 36–43 per cent of this shortfall.

Finally, national revenue generation alone would reproduce inequalities between high-traffic aviation hubs and highly vulnerable countries with small aviation markets. The findings illustrates this clearly: Mauritius, Kenya and Colombia could generate more than their historical average GCF financing, whereas Sierra Leone, Senegal and Zambia would cover only a small proportion. An effective international mechanism should therefore combine national retention with a pooled solidarity component allocated according to vulnerability, adaptation needs and fiscal capacity. Revenues should be legally earmarked, transparently reported, provided largely as grants, and treated as additional to – not substitutes for – existing GCF and developed-country climate-finance obligations. Under these conditions, an air levy could generate finance exceeding countries' historical annual access to the GCF, strengthen domestic ownership and make a meaningful contribution to closing the adaptation-finance gap. Countries should not assume that higher rates will automatically close adaptation-finance gaps. Instead, levy design should be calibrated according to route type, cabin class, market sensitivity, and the country's broader tourism and connectivity profile. It will be important to assess how passenger volumes, route composition, fare levels, and elasticity conditions become determinants of revenue beyond the levy rate alone.

The findings also reveal an equity challenge. High-throughput and tourism-oriented markets are better positioned to generate meaningful revenue, while countries with substantial climate-finance needs but smaller aviation markets may remain underfunded. Without a redistributive or pooled financing mechanism, the levy may therefore reproduce spatial inequalities in climate-finance access. For this reason, the solidarity levy should be understood not only as a national revenue instrument, but also as a potential basis for regional or international pooling, where surplus-generating markets can support countries with lower revenue potential but high adaptation needs.

Although this analysis focuses on ten countries, the patterns are informative for other developing countries including SIDS and LDCs. Tourism-oriented islands and coastal economies with diversified long-haul connectivity and a visible premium-class segment are likely to see similar outcomes, making a premium-class levy a fiscally meaningful and politically viable instrument. By contrast, landlocked or LDCs with thinner international traffic generate only modest own-market proceeds and should treat the levy primarily as a solidarity contribution, relying on a pooled redistribution window to receive net transfers.

Our simple metrics and scenario approach can be replicated by other countries to test their own levy design ex ante and to organize regional coalitions of “surplus” and “deficit” markets under a shared Climate Solidarity Alliance. In this report, the term Climate Solidarity Alliance refers to a proposed voluntary coalition of countries that adopt comparable solidarity levy principles and agree to coordinate levy design, reporting standards, and, where politically feasible, pooled redistribution from higher-yield markets to lower-yield but highly climate-vulnerable countries. Such an alliance would not replace existing multilateral climate-finance mechanisms, but would provide a complementary platform for peer learning, harmonized implementation, and solidarity-based financing.

In our study, the levy performs best for some countries where three conditions overlap: (i) high international passenger volume with a meaningful share of premium-class traffic; (ii) higher average fares (and thus stronger yield per passenger at calibrated rates); and (iii) tourism-linked climate risks that make the use of proceeds immediately visible (e.g., coastal protection and resilient tourism assets). Where outbound travel is driven by workers, students, or medical trips, elasticity can be higher and political acceptance lower unless safeguards are added. Finally, markets facing strong route competition from nearby hubs may worry about leakage if rates are mis-calibrated; these countries benefit from conservative tiers, phased introduction, and regional alignment. In short, high-volume, premium class-rich, tourism-exposed economies are strong candidates for immediate adoption and contribution to pooling, while thin-market or high-sensitivity economies should proceed with lower levy rates, rely on pooled top-ups, and emphasize safeguards to protect essential connectivity.

Box 3: Comparative analysis

A premier-class solidarity levy can operate in two distinct ways depending on where it is implemented. When introduced in wealthy, high-emitting countries, it can function primarily as an international solidarity instrument, with revenues channelled into multilateral climate funds or redistributive windows for vulnerable countries. However, in the countries considered in this study, the policy logic is different. Here, the levy is assessed primarily as a domestic revenue-retention mechanism, where proceeds would be collected nationally and earmarked for domestic adaptation, climate-resilient tourism infrastructure, coastal protection, water security, early warning, and other priority resilience investments.

Therefore, the comparative value of the levy in this report lies not in replacing international climate finance, but in creating a predictable national co-financing stream that can complement external funds and strengthen the country's ability to mobilize matching or blended finance. The below table presents a summary of comparisons of climate finance instruments using four policy-relevant criteria: *predictability, equity design, political viability, and sensitivity to demand*. These criteria are important because the countries assessed in this study require financing instruments that are not only capable of raising revenue, but also administratively feasible, socially acceptable, and unlikely to undermine tourism connectivity.

The comparison shows that a premium-class levy performs strongly because it combines predictable revenue collection with a progressive incidence structure. An all-passenger levy may affect economy-class travellers and therefore create regressivity concerns. But the premium-class levy targets passengers with greater ability to pay. Unlike broader carbon-pricing instruments, it is also narrower in scope and therefore potentially easier to introduce politically. Its demand risk is also comparatively lower because premium passengers are generally less price-sensitive than economy passengers, although the analysis shows that this varies by country and route structure.

Financing instrument	**Predictability**	**Equity design**	**Political viability**	**Sensitivity to demand**
Premier-class passenger levy	High (earmarked, steady)	Strong (progressive by cabin)	Moderate–High (narrow incidence)	Low–Moderate
All-passenger aviation levy	High	Weak–Moderate (regressive unless tiered)	Low–Moderate	Moderate–High
Aviation fuel tax	High (if permitted)	Moderate	Low (treaty/ICAO constraints)	Moderate
Carbon pricing (ETS/offsets)	High (once established)	Moderate (can recycle revenues)	Low–Very Low	High (broad price signal)

Policy recommendations

1. ***Standardize the levy design and embed it in law with earmarking****:* Codify a business/first-class solidarity levy in primary legislation, tiered by short/long haul, applied on both arrivals and departures, and legally earmarked to adaptation. This standardization limits loopholes, ensures predictable collections, and protects the public compact by linking every unit of revenue to visible, audited adaptation outcomes. Annual MRV and independent audits should be required in law to ensure credibility.

2. ***Keep the instrument progressive and protect essential connectivity:*** Anchor the design on the principle of ability-to-pay by focusing on premium cabins and add narrow, targeted safeguards for essential mobility. Medical, student, and critical public-service travel can be capped or exempted; remote or thin routes can receive time-bound waivers. This ensures equity and protects connectivity without diluting the instrument's core revenue logic. Our elasticity findings justify a careful exemptions list rather than broad carve-outs.

3. ***Recognize the levy under international climate-finance architecture:*** Seek formal recognition of levy proceeds as innovative finance eligible for matching by the GCF, the LDCF, SCCF, the Fund for Responding to Loss & Damage (FRLD), and the Adaptation Fund. This matters because many climate-finance proposals require evidence of national ownership, counterpart financing, or a sustainable financing stream. A legally established and transparently monitored levy could therefore strengthen countries' ability to leverage matching or blended finance from international sources. In practical terms, this could be operationalized through a standardized levy-MRV annex attached to climate-finance proposals. This annex would document how the levy is collected, how much revenue it generates, how funds are earmarked, and how expenditures are linked to adaptation outcomes. Such an approach would improve credibility, reduce concerns about double counting, and help international funds assess whether domestic levy proceeds are being used effectively.

4. ***Link the levy to national climate funds and a Climate Solidarity Alliance:*** Treat the levy as a dedicated revenue stream for the national adaptation fund (or a ring-fenced window), programmed through multi-year envelopes in coastal protection, water security, health, early warning, and resilient tourism infrastructure. Joining a regional Climate Solidarity Alliance enables shared appraisal tools, peer review, and joint procurement, reducing transaction costs and improving value for money. Pipeline scorecards and benefit-distribution analyses should be published to maintain public trust. In this report, Climate Solidarity Alliance refers to a proposed voluntary coalition of participating countries that adopt comparable solidarity levy principles and agree to coordinate levy design, reporting standards, and, where politically feasible, pooled redistribution from higher-yield aviation markets to lower-yield but highly climate-vulnerable countries. Such an alliance would not replace existing multilateral climate-finance mechanisms; rather, it would provide a complementary platform for peer learning, harmonized implementation, joint advocacy, and solidarity-based financing.

5. ***Strengthen MRV, data transparency, and communications:*** Standardize reporting across collection, allocation, and impact, with monthly airline/airport remittances, quarterly spend updates from the adaptation fund, and an annual audited impact report. Public dashboards and simple traveller-facing explainers (e.g., "Your ticket contributed X to flood defences") help sustain buy-in from both travellers and the tourism industry. Consistent MRV also supports international recognition and matching finance.

6. ***Engage airlines, airports, and tourism actors early:*** Establish a standing forum with airlines, airports, hotel federations, and tourism boards to co-design operational details and monitor competitiveness. MoUs on ticket-level collection and reconciliation, plus early-warning tracking of route health and occupancy, reduce friction costs and surface issues, like potential displacement, before they become material.

7. ***Review and calibration of rates using periodic elasticity assessments****:* Mandate an elasticity review every 24–36 months using updated passenger volumes, fare data, and tourism indicators, then recalibrate levy tiers accordingly. Our results show average demand effects are modest at calibrated rates, but a few markets are more price-sensitive due to thinner routes or lower average fares.

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Annex 1: Comparative analysis of GCF financing and potential air-levy revenue

Country	**Total GCF funding (USD mn)**	**First approval year**	**Years to 2024**	**Avg annual GCF (USD mn/yr)**	**Gross revenue 2024**	**Gross revenue 2025**	**Adjusted revenue 2024**	**Adjusted revenue 2025**	**Adjusted % of GCF 2024**	**Adjusted % of GCF 2025**	**Adjusted revenue 2035**	**Adjusted revenue as % of GCF, 2035**
Antigua and Barbuda	53.9	2018	7	7.70	6.81	7.08	6.41	6.66	83.2%	86.5%	8.48	110.2%
Barbados	245	2018	7	35.00	9.97	10.02	9.72	9.79	27.8%	28.0%	12.04	35.2%
Colombia	364	2017	8	45.50	53.01	55.23	49.62	51.81	109.1%	113.9%	65.06	143.0%
Fiji	73	2015	10	7.30	4.49	4.65	4.38	4.53	60.0%	62.1%	5.55	75.9%
Kenya	493	2015	10	49.30	89.64	95.93	84.21	90.39	170.8%	183.3%	110.83	224.8%
Mauritius	88	2016	9	9.78	22.83	23.57	22.04	22.76	225.4%	232.7%	28.36	289.9%
Mozambique	111	2019	6	18.50	10.02	10.46	9.49	9.93	51.3%	53.7%	12.40	67.0%
Senegal	307	2015	10	30.70	6.03	6.25	5.93	6.15	19.3%	20.0%	7.49	24.4%
Sierra Leone	72.2	2020	5	14.44	1.43	1.56	1.41	1.54	9.7%	10.6%	1.77	12.2%
Zambia	184	2018	7	26.29	5.85	6.19	5.70	6.05	21.7%	23.0%	7.26	27.6%

Revenue in USD million. Adjusted = gross revenue × (1 − levy-induced decrease in premium-class demand), by route type.