



# From Seville to Belém: A Roadmap for Solidarity Levies from FFD4 to COP30

A report by the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force

June 2025



FFD4 2025,  
Seville



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# Contents

<b>FROM SEVILLA TO BELÉM: A ROADMAP FOR SOLIDARITY LEVIES FROM FFD4 TO COP30 .....</b>	<b>1</b>
FOREWORD FROM THE SHERPAS OF THE CO-CHAIRS .....	3
<b>PROGRESS SINCE COP29 .....</b>	<b>5</b>
BUILDING PROPOSALS FOR SOLIDARITY LEVIES.....	5
<i>Coalitions of the willing</i> .....	5
<i>Further technical work</i> .....	12
<i>Action via global agreements</i> .....	13
USE OF REVENUES FROM SOLIDARITY LEVIES.....	15
<b>NEXT STEPS: FROM SEVILLA TO BELÉM.....</b>	<b>16</b>

## Foreword from the Sherpas of the Co-Chairs

When our heads of state and government formed the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, the aim was clear: by COP30, promote the implementation of global solidarity levies as an innovative source of finance to support the delivery of climate and development goals in developing and vulnerable countries.

The case for solidarity levies is even more pressing and essential now, as it did when the Task Force began at COP28 in November 2023. Financing gaps for sustainable development are large and growing. A lack of affordable finance is widespread in developing countries. There is a critical gap facing concessional financing, which is simply vital for many development priorities, especially related to climate change and its impacts, but also other threats such as pandemics. The best and quickest way today to increase concessional financing significantly in the short term is through levies. This case is now clear, and progress is feasible, even against geopolitical headwinds.

The Task Force has made significant progress on this agenda since its inception. We have explored a wide range of options for potential solidarity levies, covering sectors of the economy that are polluting, under-taxed or which have benefited significantly from globalization without paying back. We have undertaken in-depth technical analysis examining how we can design solidarity levies in a fair, equitable and progressive manner, ensuring a minimal impact on households and businesses while maximizing the impact the revenues can have for climate and development.

Many of the options outlined in our progress report published at COP29 are strong ideas. On one of these proposals, we have already moved forward. The agreement at the International Maritime Organization on an economic element for decarbonizing shipping that will deliver a degree of financing to support a just and equitable transition is an important step in the right direction. Now is the time to go further and the natural next step is to look at aviation. A coalition of the willing can act quickly to implement highly progressive levies targeted at premium flyers and private jets with limited economic impacts while creating a sizeable revenue stream. Ten years after the Paris Agreement and twenty years after the first airplane ticket solidarity levy, COP30 is an opportunity to deliver tangible progress.

Other areas have raised significant interest, such as a levy on either fossil fuel extraction or profits, and a financial transactions tax, as the public consultation showed. Novel ideas are also gaining traction, such as cryptocurrencies which have a significant environmental footprint and have quickly become a major market asset. The Task Force will continue to work together to advance action on all these options and report back by COP30.

Equally important to the design of levies is how the revenues from them are used and distributed. A significant share of the proceeds, whether used domestically and/or globally, will be used to fund

resilience and risk mitigation expenditures, ensuring an increase in domestic resource mobilization as a predictable financing source (in particular with regards to climate change mitigation and adaptation, pandemics and other development challenges), and with the possibility to use parts of the proceeds through international solidarity and partnerships.

We are now only a few months away from the deadline in Belém. The Task Force remains determined in its mission. We are grateful to count on a number of strong and committed partners working alongside us, such as the World Bank, IMF, UN, OECD, UNCTAD, G24, V20/CVF, Green Climate Fund, the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, and more recently UNITAID and the Under2 Coalition. We are also delighted to be a leading initiative under the Pact for Prosperity, People and the Planet (4P). We are also honoured to be an initiative of the Sevilla Platform for Action, thereby contributing to the lasting legacy of FFD4. We call on all governments to join our efforts as we proceed towards delivering a coalition of the willing implementing a solidarity levy for development and climate finance by COP30. In doing so, we can break new ground to ensure a fairer and more effective financial system that truly delivers for both people and the planet.

**Dr Arnold McIntyre**



*Principal Technical Advisor,  
Barbados*

**William Roos**



*Assistant Secretary,  
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**Ali Mohamed**



*Special Climate Envoy,  
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# Progress since COP29

## Building proposals for solidarity levies

### **Summary**

*Since COP29, the Task Force has made significant strides at a technical level to advance concrete proposals for solidarity levies. With a polluter pays approach now adopted for shipping at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in April 2025, attention is now turning towards other sectors. A focus has been placed on options for aviation, fossil fuels and a financial transactions levy as these are viable to move forwards as a coalition of the willing in the short-term. The Task Force commissioned independent studies across these areas to look at the potential impacts on households and distributional effects. These studies will help inform the design of levies in an equitable and progressive manner. The Task Force is also launching a group of experts on a cryptocurrency levy who will deliver final recommendations by COP30.*

### **Background**

At COP29, the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force published a progress report which outlined a set of areas in which it was exploring possible options for solidarity levies.

Following this report, the Task Force issued an open consultation on a set of 16 straw-man options for proposals on solidarity levies. The options covered a wide range of sectors including aviation, shipping, fossil fuels, financial transactions, carbon pricing, cryptocurrencies, plastics, and ultra-high net worth individuals.

The Task Force has matured dialogue throughout the first half of 2025, including a key high-level discussion at a ministerial meeting that took place during the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington DC in April 2025.

The discussions to date have made clear that there are three broad categories of solidarity levies which can be distinguished by the mode and format through which progress now needs to be advanced.

### **Coalitions of the willing**

Some options for solidarity levies are well suited to be advanced in the near-term via coalitions of willing governments. They do not necessarily require global agreement and can be implemented under the sovereignty of governments at a domestic level.

## Aviation levy

### Key facts

- **Aviation is one of the largest polluting sectors of the global economy**, contributing to 2.5% of global energy-related CO2 [emissions](#).
- **Aviation emissions are projected to grow rapidly**, by an estimated 300% by 2050 due to rising air travel [demand](#).
- **Aviation emissions are largely attributable to the wealthiest** since 1% of the world's population is responsible for more than 50% the global climate emissions from [aviation](#).

The potential of aviation levies to serve as a tool for international solidarity has already been demonstrated with the UNITAID airline ticket tax, launched by France in 2006 and adopted by 11 other countries. The tax has raised over \$2 billion since its inception, providing substantial financing for health programs in developing countries.

Aviation levies also build on existing experiences. At least 29 countries currently impose some form of aviation taxation, including passenger ticket taxes and levies on jet fuel. This includes at least 15 EU member states, as well as tourism-dependent Small Island Developing States such as Barbados and Fiji.

At COP29, the Task Force undertook to further consider options for both a kerosene levy and a ticket levy. Studies on the design, feasibility, revenue generation potential and impacts of these levies, including an independent study commissioned by the Task Force, have deepened insight into the potential benefits and challenges of their implementation.

## Ticket levies

### Key facts

- **Luxury air tickets are 2.6-4.3 times more [polluting](#)** per passenger than economy.
- **3 out of 4 people support taxation on wealthier passengers** (first class, business class and private jets) according to recent [polling](#) by Oxfam and Greenpeace).
- **The growth of premium travel has outpaced economy-class travel**. According to [IATA](#), as of May 2024, the number of premium passengers had increased by 43% from January 2023, while economy class travel grew by 23% during the same period.

A ticket levy is an attractive option in the context of building a coalition of the willing by COP30, as they could be implemented by countries domestically and quickly. Ticket levies could also allow for more progressive taxation than fuel levies. A fuel levy cannot distinguish between passenger types and thus is non-progressive; in contrast, ticket levies can be more tailored to reflect the fact that a small share of the global population accounts for the majority of flights and associated CO2 emissions. 1% of the world population [emits](#) 50% of CO2 from commercial aviation and the top 2% most frequent flyers take about 40% of the [flights](#). Targeting ticket levies at wealthier passengers in business class and first class would limit the revenue generation potential but would also significantly reduce potential negative impacts on businesses, households and concerns around distortive impacts on tourism-dependent economies. It also reflects climate justice, as those who fly



the least (predominantly in the Global South) are suffering the most from climate impacts caused by wealthy, frequent flyers.

Even in countries that already impose ticket levies there may be scope for adjusting policies to ensure more progressivity. For instance, many ticket levies currently do not discriminate between business and first class, nor include premium economy. Introducing distinguished rates for these classes can be a more equitable approach that would raise additional revenues.

According to recent [analysis](#) commissioned by the GSLTF, a levy on business and first-class tickets for international and domestic flights implemented globally could raise up to **€37bn per year**.



### A levy on private jet kerosene


#### Key facts:

- Emissions from private jets [increased](#) by 46% between 2019-2023.
- The market for private jets is expected to grow 50% by [2030](#).
- A private jet flight from London to Paris is 6 times more [polluting](#) per passenger than a commercial flight, 12 times more polluting per passenger than a petrol car, and 180 times more polluting per passenger than a Eurostar train.

A levy on private jet kerosene is especially appealing as a stable tax base that can raise revenues without significant market distortions. This is because of the low price sensitivity of private jet users who are very wealthy and can afford to own or book a private plane. In comparison to a general levy on aviation fuel, private jets are typically not covered by Air Service Agreements (further information below), so implementation can be straight-forward in a coalition of the willing format.



According to recent [analysis](#) commissioned by the GSLTF, a levy on the kerosene used for private jets globally could raise approximately €41bn per year.



### A levy on kerosene fuel

#### Key facts

- Currently kerosene fuel for international aviation is generally not taxed at all
- In contrast, the fuel used by motorists every day is taxed significantly: in the [G20](#), the average pricing of kerosene in 2021 was 9 euros/ton of CO<sub>2</sub> compared with 79 euros for diesel and 68 euros for gasoline.

A levy on kerosene fuel could be advantageous. According to recent [analysis](#) commissioned by the GSLTF, a levy on the kerosene used for commercial aviation both internationally and domestically could raise approximately €106bn per year if implemented on a global basis. In addition to raising revenues it would incentivise airlines to invest in decarbonisation measures.

There are no major legal obstacles for governments to tax kerosene in a coalition of the willing format. On the whole, the decision not to tax aviation fuel is a political decision rather than a response to a legal [restriction](#). It is a common misconception that the Chicago Convention (the framework for international civil aviation) prohibits taxation of kerosene fuel. Air Service Agreements (ASAs) between countries sometimes include clauses exempting or prohibiting jet fuel from taxation 'on the basis of reciprocity'. This is not an absolute exemption but an agreement that, if one state begins to tax aviation fuel, then the other state may do the same, without violating the agreement. New instruments could be established to override or rewrite ASAs where needed.

An alternative route could be introducing a measure through a global framework at the International Civil Aviation Organisation. While legally possible, this may not yield results for a number of years as it would require undertaking multilateral negotiations with 193 member states.

## Fossil fuel levy

It is clear that fossil fuels represent a major financial resource that remains largely untapped at international level for fund climate action and development. Governments receive substantial revenue from the fossil fuel industry, in various forms (for example in royalties, profits and excise duties). A [UNDP](#) study of 40 highly fossil fuel dependent countries showed that the average country generated fossil fuel rents of 14.3% of GDP; fossil fuels accounted for 61.2% of exports; and resource revenue represented 38.6% of total government revenue.

However, in general these revenues are not directly earmarked for investment in the ecological transition and low-carbon development of vulnerable countries, representing a missed opportunity for an equitable polluter-pays approach to global financing. Notably, according to the [IMF](#), fossil fuel subsidies globally were \$7 trillion in 2022, equivalent to 7.1% of GDP. This indicates that a large proportion of these state revenues are reinvested in the same sector. In some cases, oil and gas companies effectively pay no tax, once tax reliefs and rebates for activities like decommissioning and field development costs are considered (for example, Shell effectively paid no tax on North Sea oil and gas drilling in the UK in [2024](#)).

Solidarity levies on oil and gas are very popular. According to recent [polling](#) by Oxfam and Greenpeace, 81% of people surveyed across 13 countries support new taxes on the oil, coal and gas industry to pay for damages caused by fossil-fuel driven climate disasters like storms, floods, droughts and wildfires. Moreover, 86% of people in surveyed countries support channeling revenues from higher taxes on oil and gas corporations towards communities who are most impacted by the climate crisis.

At COP29, the Task Force undertook to further consider options for both an extraction levy and a levy on profits (excess profits or profits in general).

## Extraction levy

A levy on extraction of fossil fuels could be a significant source of new revenues. In its most expansive form, a steadily increasing levy (from a base of \$5 per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>, rising \$5 per year) implemented by all major oil producers could raise as much as [\\$571bn per year by 2035](#).

However, there are challenges associated with the implementation of a fossil fuel levy. A levy would reshape global oil markets, with declines in oil revenue and production level from implementing countries, but there would be a risk that non-participating countries benefit from elevated oil prices. This asymmetric outcome raises issues of equity and political feasibility. There are also questions related to the domestic legal and political contexts that need to be addressed, such as fiscal stabilisation policies or bilateral investment treaties that could pose challenges to implementation. These require further examination by the Task Force to advance action in this area towards COP30, as it is clear that the design and delivery of specific mechanisms at the national level will need to be tailored to specific contexts.

Identifying ways to incentivise the participation of major oil producing and exporting countries is key to ensure effective outcomes. This has led to proposals such as cooperative [agreements](#) between fossil fuel exporters and importers. Under a ‘club’ arrangement, it could be in the interest of consumer

and producer countries to join forces for ambitious transition policies involving the implementation of carbon pricing in producer countries in exchange for preferential market access conditions in consumer countries. Further political dialogue on how to incentivise the participation of exporter and producer countries is an important next step.

## Profits levy

585 of the world's largest and most polluting fossil fuel companies made \$583 billion in [profits](#) in 2024, a 68% increase since 2019. Some countries have already taken action to address excessive profits from oil and gas companies at a regional level. This includes efforts at the EU level following the sharp rise in oil and gas prices following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, whereby the European Commission recommended a minimum 33% tax on fossil fuel companies' 'surplus profits', which were defined as profits above 120% of the past five years average. During 2022-2023 this generated an estimated [€28 billion](#) of additional tax revenues for EU Member States.

There are clear opportunities to turn such temporary measures into permanent mechanisms. At the national level, new levies on oil and gas profits can be increased or introduced. However, one of the core challenges associated with the taxation of fossil fuel profits is tax evasion. This affects all countries in the oil and gas value chain, although with varying degrees based on their production cost and seniority on the market.

In producing countries, this involves the shifting of profits to headquarters offshore and to low-tax jurisdictions. Moreover, producing countries have an incentive to establish low oil and gas taxation regimes in order to attract investment and the development of the fossil fuel sector by international energy companies. Tax receipts in countries introducing new oil and gas exploration are often low as the investment costs associated with capital expenditure for new oil and gas fields can be written off as tax deductible.

There are also problems in countries where oil and gas companies are headquartered. National level taxation on oil and gas profits can easily be avoided through companies shifting profits to tax havens. Windfall profit taxes have some design flaws, as thresholds defining excessive profits can be avoided through accounting practices to adjust profits reported. All of these factors underscore the importance of enhanced cooperation and coordination at the international level when it comes to strengthening profit taxation on the fossil fuel sector.

In the short-term, collaborative action is needed by governments working together to ensure policies are introduced or maintained that would minimise the risks associated with base erosion and profit shifting. It is important that action is taken to ensure a fair allocation of taxing rights between countries and to comprehensively tackle low-tax jurisdictions. This is especially important for many developing countries.

In the medium to long-term, countries could envision collaborations to improve the existing institutional frameworks to address tax evasion, while adapting it to the specificities of the oil and gas industry.

First, the BEPS Pillar One of the 2021 Inclusive framework agreements specifically excluded the extractive industry from its scope<sup>1</sup>. In the long-term, there could also be potential opportunities to reverse the logic of the existing agreement and moving towards a specific global framework for taxing the consolidated profits of oil and gas multinational enterprises. Such a proposal would go beyond existing systems to ensure that global profits are subject to taxation in a manner that would ensure a just and equitable taxation of these companies with regards to their contribution to climate change and ensuring revenues are received by developing countries that currently otherwise are channelled abroad.

Second, the BEPS Pillar 2 set out global minimum tax rules to ensure that largest multinational enterprises pay a minimum effective rate of 15% on taxation of profits in all jurisdictions. However, it is important to note that these rules provide a list of excluded entities<sup>2</sup> like government entities. Many companies in the extractive industry are state-owned (e.g. Saudi Aramco, China National Petroleum Corporation, Gazprom, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation etc.) and these are likely not affected by the global minimum corporate tax rate. Enforcing these rules to all extractive companies is key to ensuring a functioning basis of taxation on oil and gas companies.

## **Financial transactions levies**

30 countries currently have a tax on financial transactions, more specifically on the trading of shares, raising around \$17 billion annually. Around 50% of this revenue comes from European countries and 40% from East Asia.

However, these existing levies are underused and could yield much more revenue. The total transaction volume in 2022 amounts to over \$170 trillion based on World Bank and Refinitiv data.

A broader application of existing FTTs could raise an additional \$87 billion per year, bringing the total potential revenue to \$104 billion, as research [commissioned](#) by the Task Force shows. The additional revenue could be generated mainly through two options:

- Countries that do not have an FTT yet could adopt one at 0.5% on taxable share transactions (at the level of the UK stamp duty, the oldest tax in the world)
- Those that already have FTTs could extend their rates to at least 0.5%

The estimates are extremely conservative assumptions, such as a uniform share of 15% of taxable transactions only and a 20% decrease in transaction volume.

As an example, France's cumulative FTT revenues since 2012 and adjusted for inflation amount to \$15.3 billion. By applying the same parameters to Germany - with a tax rate of 0.2% from 2013 to 2016, increasing to 0.3% from 2017 to 2022, and assuming a 20% decline in transactions - the foregone FTT tax revenue amounts to \$13.4 billion.

It is also interesting to note that the distribution of these revenues would be heavily skewed towards high- income and upper middle-income countries, with \$54 billion coming from North America (US

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<sup>1</sup> Recognizing the unique nature of natural resource taxation and the established principle that taxation rights belong to the jurisdiction where the resources are located.

<sup>2</sup> Article 1.5 of the Model Rules, which include government entities

& Canada), \$23 billion from East Asia and Pacific and \$9 billion from Europe and Central Asia. A wider introduction of FTTs in any country with a reasonable-sized stock market (based on World Bank and Refinitiv data) for solidarity purposes would automatically allow for a way of global redistribution, because the majority of large-size stock markets are located in wealthier countries.

Apart from revenue generation, the taxation of the trading of shares also has public policy benefits. Generally, there is a bias towards short-term trading and against long-term valuations, incentivising activities that have contributed to global warming. A small, enforceable FTT on share trading would reduce this bias by making business models based on heavy short-term trading less profitable than before, pushing trading and valuations to the longer-term.

Taxation on equity transactions should be considered as the simplest way of generating significant income with little political cost and barely any negative impact on financial markets.

As the 30 existing FTTs show, there is no critical mass needed to implement them and generate significant revenue, even without taxing derivatives. FTTs can be implemented and enforced nationally without international coordination. Recent examples like the French, Italian or Spanish ones show that tax evasion is very limited. The French example suggests that once we consider non-HFT (non-High Frequency Trading), the elasticity of turnover is less than 10%, backed by studies from Italy and Spain. The impact of the tax on price volatility was statistically insignificant (regardless of different measures of volatility).

Political dialogues on the opportunity of the FTT are emerging. In April 2025, the Polish Presidency of the Council of the EU published a non-paper on potential new own resources for the EU budget. This paper included the option of an own resource based on an FTT, thereby raising again the prospect of re-starting dialogues on this instrument at the EU level, or via an enhanced cooperation framework which had previously begun in 2013 but which did not make progress at the time.

## Further technical work

Some options for solidarity levies require further technical work to mature them as viable proposals.

### Cryptocurrency levy

Cryptocurrencies are no longer a fringe innovation. With a market capitalization that peaked at \$3 trillion in late 2021 before stabilizing around \$1 trillion in 2023, they are reshaping finance and economic behaviour globally. This rapid growth, particularly in developing countries, brings both opportunities and pressing policy challenges. New research commissioned by the Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce and emerging academic and institutional analyses highlight the urgent need for coordinated tax responses to ensure fairness, transparency, and sustainable revenue generation.

Cryptocurrencies pose unique challenges to traditional tax systems. Their dual role as speculative assets and alternative currencies complicates classification, enforcement, and reporting. Ownership remains highly concentrated—while 0.01% of investors hold most of the crypto wealth, a growing share of users in low-income countries turn to crypto for remittances and daily transactions<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> IMF Working Paper WP/23/144 “Taxing Cryptocurrencies”, July 2023

Revenue potential is significant. Capital gains tax collections from crypto trading could amount to tens of billions of dollars globally, potentially varying from \$15.8 billion for a 0.1% financial transaction tax, to up to \$323 billion for an accrual-based capital gains tax of 20% in a boom year according to the IMF. But perhaps more critically, value-added and sales tax systems risk substantial leakage as digital transactions go unreported or underreported due to anonymity and decentralized platforms. The problem is especially acute in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where crypto adoption is outpacing institutional capacity. In Nigeria, Kenya, and Vietnam, more than 20% of the adult population reportedly own or use cryptocurrencies—rates that exceed those of most high-income countries<sup>4</sup>. These users rely on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks that largely bypass traditional regulatory and tax frameworks.

As cross-border crypto transactions increase, enforceability becomes critical. The OECD's Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) marks an important first step, but gaps in third-party reporting and limited global reach remain. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to crypto-enabled tax base erosion<sup>5</sup>

Recent research underscores that policy responses must account for local context. In high-income countries, crypto is primarily an investment asset. In LMICs, it acts as a remittance channel, inflation hedge, and substitute for weak financial institutions<sup>6</sup>. Accordingly, tax rules must differentiate between use cases. Overly aggressive taxation of P2P transfers may unintentionally harm financial inclusion and economic resilience.

A one-size-fits-all solution is neither feasible nor desirable. However, common principles—including clarity in tax characterization (property vs. currency), recognition of taxable events, and targeted information reporting—are needed to guide national approaches and foster international cooperation.

Considering these developments, the Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce is launching an expert group to develop recommendations for cryptocurrency taxation policy. The group, composed of 10-15 global experts from academia, civil society, and international institutions, will work on producing a consensus-based policy report for COP30.

The group will assess issues such as taxation of crypto-based income and transactions, environmental impacts of crypto mining, regulatory treatment of decentralized finance, and the role of blockchain in financing global public goods. It will also review the effectiveness of current frameworks such as CARF and propose pathways for broader international cooperation.

## Action via global agreements

The final category concerns proposals for levies that are being, or could be, advanced via intergovernmental negotiations in relevant multilateral fora, primarily at the United Nations.

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<sup>4</sup> Tatiana Falcão and Bob Michel, "The Rise of Cryptocurrencies in Developing World Highlights Need for Guidance," Tax Notes Int'l, Feb. 14, 2022

<sup>5</sup> Tatiana Falcão and Bob Michel, "Cryptoization through currency substitution: tax policy options for low-income countries" Tax Notes Int'l, Nov.21, 2022

<sup>6</sup> The Rise of Cryptocurrencies in the Developing World



## Shipping levy

The Marine Environment Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) approved a Net-Zero Framework in April 2025. It is the first in the world to combine mandatory emissions limits and greenhouse gas (GHG) pricing across an entire industry sector and therefore is a historic step. These [measures](#) are set to be formally adopted in October 2025, before entry into force in 2027.

The framework does not include a levy mechanism which a coalition of over 60 countries covering the Pacific, Caribbean, Africa and Europe including Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) had advocated for. Instead, it sets out measures whereby ships emitting above a given threshold will have to purchase remedial units to account for their high emissions, while those using zero or near-zero GHG technologies will be eligible for financial rewards.

Estimates suggest that the measures should generate [revenues](#) of around \$10-12 billion per year until 2035. Under the framework, revenues can be allocated to a number of objectives to support a just and equitable transition. This includes “*facilitating environmental and climate protection, adaptation and resilience building within the boundaries of the energy transition in shipping*”. [Analysts](#) have concluded that the estimated revenues would be insufficient relative support adoption of zero and near zero GHG fuels, and to fund a just and equitable transition that fully considers the needs and priorities for developing countries. The review of the mechanism which is planned for 2028 will be important to strengthen the framework so that is facilitate the provision of adequate finance to ensure the goals of ensuring a just and equitable transition are met.

Despite these [shortcomings](#), the IMO framework represents an important example of a polluter pays principle being applied to a global industry and enshrines the principle that revenues generated also have to be distributed ‘out of the sector’ to help countries cope with the impacts of the climate damage caused. In doing so it sets a precedent for similar approaches being pursued in other settings that are under consideration by the Task Force.

## Plastics levy

The fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-5.1), tasked with developing an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, took place last November. Member states were unable to reach an agreement, and discussions now continue at INC-5.2 in August this year. Given that plastic pollution is projected to triple by 2060, posing a severe threat to both the environment and human health, progress via multilateral negotiations is critical. A [proposal for a plastic polymer fee](#), tabled by Ghana, offers a potential mechanism to close the financing gap for meeting the objective of ending plastic pollution.

## UN Tax Convention

Negotiations on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation have continued to move forward, following the adoption of the Terms of Reference for its development in August 2024 and the conclusion of the organizational session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in February 2025.



Although not adopted as a topic of a second early protocol to be negotiated by 2027, environmental taxation remains a core area for action in the context of negotiating substantive outcomes under the Convention. The Task Force continues to aim to serve as a complementary space to create political momentum with a coalition of frontrunners countries on this issue by COP30.

## Use of revenues from solidarity levies

Many governments and experts throughout consultations with the Task Force to date have emphasised the importance of linking the use of revenues and the proposal for a solidarity levy, recognising that public and political support for a levy can be strengthened through a clear understanding of how the proceeds from a levy would be used.

This can be particularly powerful when there are global issues universally recognised as requiring finance and the direct impact of additional financing can be proved. In the past, global concern for diseases such as HIV/AIDS built support for the first ever international solidarity levy, the UNITAID levy on airplane tickets. Today, the climate crisis but also the recent global pandemic can be such a rationale.

At FFD4, the Task Force is launching an [open consultation](#) on a draft set of principles on the use of revenues. These principles could be adopted by the coalition of governments at COP30. The Task Force is also issuing a [call for proposals](#) on mechanisms that could be developed for the redistribution of revenues from solidarity levies to support climate and development goals in developing countries. These will help inform government discussions as progress is made towards COP30 on this topic.

## Next steps: from Sevilla to Belém

The 4<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) in Sevilla is a key opportunity to demonstrate the importance of solidarity levies as a way of significantly increasing concessional financing for development and climate goals in developing countries and globally and an essential way of increasing tax and climate justice. The Task Force is pleased to have been formally incorporated as a leading initiative under the Sevilla Platform for Action. This demonstrates the tangible contributions that the Task Force can make to the development finance agenda.

The Task Force intends to take advantage of major upcoming moments for the remainder of 2025 to advance and build on the progress achieved at FFD4. This will include, inter alia, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa Climate Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in September 2025, the UN General Assembly in New York, USA, in September 2025, the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington D.C., USA, in October 2025. These are all moments where the Task Force intends to onboard more governments and refine coalition building.

This diplomatic roadmap will serve as a channel through which the Task Force invites governments to form a coalition of the willing, with an aviation levy focused on premium travel and private jets currently as a clear leading option. In parallel, the Task Force will continue to move forward discussions on other levy options and identifying concrete mechanisms to facilitate the use of revenues. At COP30, the Task Force aims at launching a coalition of the willing on a solidarity levy for development and climate finance, while outlining a path for more progress over the coming years.

This will help position solidarity levies as a key emerging pillar of financing that can play a significant role contributing towards the fulfilment of the New Collective Quantified Goal of \$1.3 trillion USD for developing countries in climate finance by 2035. Solidarity levies are therefore expected to be a central pillar of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T.

Making solidarity levies a reality is a sprint and a marathon. COP30 needs to be the moment to translate commitments into action and prove the concept of solidarity levies. However, the highest levels of implementation will require a sustained multi-year effort from governments and other partners. At COP30, the future of the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force will be announced.